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The Geneva Conventions in 21st
Century Warfare: How the
Conventions Should Treat Civilians’
Direct Participation in Hostilities
INTRODUCTION: TARGETING IN AN
ASYMMETRICAL WORLD
D. A. Jeremy Telman∗
Abstract
This is the introduction to a collection of articles to be published in the
Valparaiso University Law Review. The articles address the challenges
presented by non-traditional warfare and non-traditional combatants in the
contexts of the War on Terror and the trend toward multilateral and
humanitarian interventions. Two of the contributions, those of Jonathan Hafetz
and David Frakt, detail the hybrid model, part criminal law, part law of war,
that the United States developed for addressing the status of detainees in the
War on Terror. Two of the contributions, those of Rachel VanLandingham and
Iain Pedden, propose international models for addressing the challenges of the
new warfare, while Laurie Blank advocates a new focus on enforcement at both
the national and international levels to address violations of the principle of
distinction. Read together, the articles in this collection present a convincing
argument that the United States needs to work with other states and
international organizations to forge international solutions to the international
problems posed by the new warfare.
Thomas Friedman has recently observed that “the world is flat”—
that is, as far as global economic competition is concerned—the playing
field is increasingly level.1 This is not the case in the realm of warfare.
On the contrary, as armed conflict increasingly involves non-state actors
opposed to state actors, or intervention in failed states by coalitions that
draw on the capabilities of the major military powers, the disparity in
military power and technology among the parties to armed conflict has
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increased markedly.2 Unable to beat state militaries at their own game,
non-state actors and the armed forces of weak states resort to tactics that
skirt or distort the laws of armed conflict, and as they do so, states
struggle to respond in a manner that is both militarily effective and
consistent with the Law of Armed Conflict (“LOAC”). The result is a
blurring of the distinction at the center of LOAC between combatants
and non-combatants.3 In asymmetrical warfare, every targeting decision
is fraught with uncertainties because the lines separating those who
lawfully may be targeted from those who may not have grown
ambiguous.
This Issue offers various proposals to address the increasing
challenge of targeting in the context of asymmetrical warfare. Taken
together, the contributions to this Issue suggest that states, confronted
with threats to their armed forces and to civilians from non-conventional
forces, have improvised, creating ad hoc legal regimes to address the
challenges of what one of our contributors has called the “new warfare,”
in which armed conflict “now takes place everywhere—in cities, refugee
camps and other historically non-military areas” rather than on
traditional battlefields.4
Part I of this Introduction lays out the framework created by the
Geneva Conventions (“the Conventions”)5 and their Additional
Protocols (“AP I” and “AP II” respectively)6 within which targeting
decisions are made. It also addresses the recent efforts by the
International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”) to provide

2
See Michael N. Schmitt, Asymmetrical Warfare and International Humanitarian Law, 62
A.F. L. REV. 1, 3–7 (2008) (describing the various asymmetries relevant to contemporary
warfare).
3
See GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW IN WAR 251 (2010) (calling distinction “the most significant battlement concept a
combatant must observe”).
4
Laurie Blank & Amos Guiora, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: Operationalizing the Law
of Armed Conflict in New Warfare, 1 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 45, 45 (2010).
5
See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31;
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135
[hereinafter GC III].
6
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter AP I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II].
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guidelines for state actors confronting non-combatants who directly
participate in hostilities. In Part II, this Introduction summarizes two
contributions to this Issue that highlight ways in which the United States
has primarily relied on domestic mechanisms in attempting to devise
strategies that can address the problems that have arisen in asymmetrical
conflicts—such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. Finally, in Part III, the
Introduction summarizes three contributions to this Issue that propose
ways forward through transnational mechanisms that will enable states
to address the challenges of the new warfare without violating LOAC
principles or compromising national security. Read together, the
contributions to this Issue present a convincing argument that the United
States needs to work with other states and international organizations to
forge international solutions to the international problems posed by the
new warfare.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Asymmetrical warfare creates difficulties with respect to LOAC’s
fundamental categories regarding conflict status and combatant status.7
In terms of the former, the Conventions create two types of conflict for
LOAC purposes, international armed conflict (“IAC”) governed by
Article 2 common to all four of the Conventions (“CA 2”),8 and noninternational armed conflict (“NIAC”), governed by Article 3 common to
all four of the Conventions (“CA 3”).9 But contemporary conflicts are
often a mixture of the two, compounded by internal disturbances that
might not rise to the level of armed conflict.10
In a recent three-part series of articles, Samuel Estreicher has explored the possibility
LOAC could privilege guerilla tactics in war. Estreicher raises concerns that certain ICRC
statements have the unintended effect of encouraging those engaged in asymmetrical
warfare to provoke state actors to engage in defensive measures that will help the guerillas
to recruit more fighters. Estreicher concludes that LOAC needs to establish incentives to
discourage harm done to civilians by both sides in asymmetrical conflicts. See Samuel
Estreicher, Privileging Asymmetric Warfare (Part III)?: The Intentional Killing of Civilians
Under International Humanitarian Law, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 589 (2012); Samuel Estreicher,
Privileging Asymmetric Warfare (Part II)?: The “Proportionality” Principle Under International
Humanitarian Law, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 143 (2011); Samuel Estreicher, Privileging Asymmetric
Warfare? Part I: Defender Duties Under International Law, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 425 (2010).
8
GC III, supra note 5. CA 2 defines IAC as “all cases of declared war or of any other
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties . . . [and] all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting
Party . . . .” Id.
9
See generally supra note 5 (citing all Conventions). While the Conventions do not
define NIAC, all armed conflicts that are not IAC are considered NIAC. The main
challenge is in determining when internal disturbances rise to the level of NIAC.
10
SOLIS, supra note 3, at 156. Gary Solis refers to such conflicts as “dual status” armed
conflicts. Id.
7
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The new warfare gives rise to new legal challenges, which existing
scholarship has only begun to address. The Bush administration took
the position in the War on Terror that the conflict in Afghanistan was
neither IAC nor NIAC, thus justifying a decision to deprive Taliban and
al Qaeda detainees of all protections afforded by LOAC, including those
of CA 3.11 The Supreme Court rejected this position, finding that the war
in Afghanistan was a form of NIAC and that detainees were thus entitled
at least to the humane treatment listed in CA 3.12 However, the War on
Terror is not limited in its scope to Iraq and Afghanistan.13 When the
United States engages with Taliban fighters in Pakistan or targets terror
suspects in Yemen or Somalia, the conflict defies easy categorization.14
In addition to conflict status, the new warfare blurs the lines that
separate combatants from civilians and thus undermines the principle of
distinction that “lies at the heart of the law governing warfare.”15 Many
of the difficulties of classification are attributable to the phenomenon
known as direct participation in hostilities (“DPH”) by non-combatants.
The basic principle of distinction posits that civilians enjoy immunity
from direct attack in the context of armed conflict “unless and for such
time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”16
In the IAC context, the Conventions and the Additional Protocols
define the term “civilians” only negatively—as those not belonging to
the armed forces of a party to a conflict and not participating in a levée en

11
See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, to Alberto
R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, & William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def.
10 (Jan. 22, 2002), available at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/
02.01.22.pdf (discussing the application of treaties and laws to al Qaeda and Taliban
Detainees); Memorandum Concerning Humane Treatment of al Qaeda & Taliban
Detainees from President George W. Bush to Richard B. Cheney, Vice President et al. 1
(Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.02.
07.pdf (“I accept the legal conclusion of the Department of Justice and determine that none
of the provisions of Geneva apply to our conflict with al Qaeda in Afghanistan or
elsewhere throughout the world . . . .”).
12
See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630–31 (2006) (noting the broad, intended
scope of the term “non-international armed conflict” and finding CA 3 applied to the
conflict with al Qaeda in Afghanistan).
13
See Jonathan Hafetz, Redefining State Power and Individual Rights in the War on
Terrorism, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 843, 847 (2012) (noting the battlefield in the War on Terror is
global and the duration of the conflict is open-ended).
14
Cf. id. at 3 (observing some Guantánamo Bay detainees were captured in Bosnia and
The Gambia).
15
Laurie Blank, Taking Distinction to the Next Level: Accountability for Fighters’ Failure to
Distinguish Themselves from Civilians, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 765, 765 (2012). The principle of
distinction was first codified in the AP I. AP I, supra note 6, at art. 48. Nonetheless, states
recognize the principle as binding customary law. Blank, supra, at 769.
16
AP I, supra note 6, at art. 51.
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masse.17 In the NIAC context, it is far more difficult to draw clear lines
between civilians and combatants. The ICRC concludes that civilians are
“all persons who are not members of [s]tate armed forces or organized
armed groups of a party to the conflict.”18
After six years of consultation and drafting,19 the ICRC in 2009
published its Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation
in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law (“ICRC Guidance”).
While this document by no means settles the innumerable issues
surrounding DPH,20 it has in fact been subject to numerous critical
commentaries.21 It has considerable persuasive authority and certainly
sets out the parameters for debate.
While combatants generally may not target civilians, they may target
those who DPH. In addition, harm to people who DPH need not be
See id. at art. 50(1). AP I also defines armed forces of a party to a conflict as:
The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed
forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to
that Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is
represented by a government or an authority not recognized by an
adverse Party. Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal
disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the
rules of international law applicable in armed conflict.
Id. at art. 43(1).
18
Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under
International Humanitarian Law, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 991, 1002 (2008) [hereinafter ICRC
Guidance], available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-872-reportsdocuments.pdf. Other sources site to different pagination, but this Introduction will refer
to this version.
19
See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, The ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of
Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law: An Introduction to the
Forum, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 637, 637–38 (2010) (noting the document was the result
of a six-year process, including meetings of military and humanitarian law experts in
Geneva and The Hague between 2003 and 2008).
20
See David J.R. Frakt, Direction Participation in Hostilities as a War Crime: America’s Failed
Efforts to Change the Law of War, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 729, 730 (2012) (arguing it could not do
so, as the numerous meetings aided the ICRC in drafting its “Guidance” did not produce a
consensus in all areas).
21
See, e.g., W. Hays Parks, Part IX of the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Study:
No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 769, 830 (2010)
(concluding that Part IX of the ICRC Guidance ignored the advice of its experts, which
resulted in faulty conclusions presented without supporting information); Michael N.
Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: A Critical
Analysis, 1 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 5, 6 (2010) (noting some scholars, including Schmitt himself,
participated in the meetings that produced the ICRC Guidance, but ultimately withdrew
their names from the final draft); Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed
Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guidance, 42 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 641, 643 (2010) (finding the ICRC Guidance failed to resolve long-standing
debates regarding the distinction between combatants and civilians and targeting in noninternational armed conflicts).
17
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considered when assessing whether or not a targeting decision was
proportional, in the LOAC sense of not causing excessive harm to
civilians or non-military property.22 The ICRC Guidance recognizes the
need for combatants to be able to target civilians who DPH to protect
themselves from attack and also to achieve military objectives.
But the most difficult challenge posed by the DPH problem is
determining where to draw the line between a civilian who may not be
targeted and one who may due to DPH.23 The ICRC defines DPH as
“specific hostile acts carried out by individuals as part of the conduct of
hostilities between parties to an armed conflict.”24 To qualify as DPH,
the conduct in question must satisfy three prongs: a threshold of harm,
direct causation, and the belligerent nexus.25 A civilian unconnected to
any organized armed group is a legitimate target during all phases of
DPH activities, including preparatory acts and travel to and from the site
of the DPH activity.26 A member of a non-state organized armed group
who engages in DPH activity is a legitimate target for the duration of her
membership in the group,27 so long as that person engages in
“continuous combat function.”28
The ICRC recognizes that DPH greatly complicates the challenges of
implementing the principle of distinction in targeting decisions.29
Nonetheless, the ICRC Guidance stresses the need for the people
responsible for making targeting decisions to take “all feasible
precautions” to avoid targeting civilians not engaged in DPH.30 In
addition, in a highly controversial section of the ICRC Guidance,31 the
ICRC posits, “the kind and degree of force which is permissible against
persons not entitled to protection against direct attack must not exceed
what is actually necessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose in

Schmitt, supra note 21, at 13.
See id. at 14 (calling the concept of civilian status the greatest source of controversy
among those who participated in drafting the ICRC Guidance).
24
ICRC Guidance, supra note 18, at 1015.
25
Id. at 1016–31.
26
Id. at 1031–33, 1035–36. For an in-depth critique of the ICRC Guidance’s handling of
this issue, see Bill Boothby, “And for Such Time As”: The Time Dimension to Direct
Participation in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 741, 743 (2010) (identifying three ways
in which the ICRC definition of DPH is too narrow).
27
ICRC Guidance, supra note 18, at 1036–37.
28
See id. at 1007 (“[T]he decisive criterion for individual membership in an organized
armed group is whether a person assumes a continuous function for the group involving
his or her direct participation in hostilities.”). But see Schmitt, supra note 21, at 21–24
(calling into question the practicality of the continuous combat function criterion).
29
ICRC Guidance, supra note 18, at 1039.
30
Id. at 1039–40.
31
See Parks, supra note 21, at 772.
22
23
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the prevailing circumstances.”32 Critics of the ICRC Guidance object that
this passage imports a human rights principle, the right to life, into the
lex specialis of armed conflict.33
LOAC always involves a careful reconciliation of military necessity
and the principle of humanity.34 At least some scholars familiar with the
ICRC Guidance have concluded that it deviates “from the generally
accepted balance” and that states will therefore view the Guidance
skeptically.35 Moreover, while the ICRC has provided important
guidance in its work on DPH, much of the work, including that of the
ICRC, has merely laid the groundwork for identifying civilians who
lawfully may be targeted. In its publications on DPH, the ICRC has
focused for the most part on explicating rather than developing the law.
Its guidance is an attempt to tease out the consequences of existing law,
primarily the Geneva Conventions, for civilians directly participating in
hostilities. The contributions to this Issue are not so limited. Rather,
they offer predictions about the future development of LOAC relating to
asymmetrical warfare and make recommendations regarding how it
ought to develop.
II. THE UNITED STATES’ AD HOC SOLUTIONS TO THE CHALLENGES OF THE
NEW WARFARE
The ICRC and legal scholars have devoted relatively little thought to
an enforcement regime that would deter civilians from engaging in DPH
activities through mechanisms other than military targeting. The result
has been the rise of a sort of legal limbo in which states create ad hoc
systems of detention and review for people suspected of combatancy in
asymmetrical conflicts. By their very nature, such ad hoc systems raise
due process questions under both domestic and international law. As
the rules are not devised in advance, people caught in the web of
improvised detention schemes lack notice, access to information and to
other tools that they need to defend themselves against accusations that
they are terrorists, enemy combatants or civilians unlawfully engaged in
DPH.
Professors Frakt and Hafetz point out that DPH itself is not a war
crime.36 That being the case, civilians who engage in combatancy can be
prosecuted for ordinary crimes or for crimes (such as attacking civilians)
ICRC Guidance, supra note 18, at 1044.
Parks, supra note 21, at 797.
34
Schmitt, supra note 21, at 6.
35
Id. at 6–7.
36
See Frakt, supra note 20, at 733 (citing to the ICRC Guidance for the proposition that
LOAC “neither prohibits nor privileges civilian direct participation in hostilities”).
32
33
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that they commit as part of their DPH activities. While Professor Hafetz
explores the damage that the ad hoc detention systems created during the
War on Terror have done to the U.S. system of justice, Professor Frakt
notes the conceptual gap between the dominant view that DPH is not a
war crime and the U.S. decision to prosecute people for DPH during the
War on Terror. Their contributions suggest that the United States has
developed two models for addressing DPH—a war model and a criminal
model. Neither model is entirely consistent with constitutional and
LOAC protections of detainees.
A. The Failed War Model for Dealing with DPH
Professor Hafetz details the consequences of the existing confusion
between a military and a criminal model for dealing with terror suspects.
Since terror suspects are neither combatants subject to the strictures of
LOAC nor criminals subject to domestic criminal law, the United States
and other states have created regimes that give rise to new forms of
military detention and expanded targeted killing programs, whose
legality is open to question, as well as enhanced interrogation
techniques, which are clearly unlawful.37 Professor Hafetz’s work
illustrates the harm that can arise to domestic legal systems when they
improvise solutions to gaps in international enforcement regimes.38
Professor Hafetz describes the ad hoc regimes developed under the
Bush administration in his recent book, Habeas Corpus after 9/11.39 As
Professor Hafetz notes, the mechanisms that the United States adopted
to address the threat of terrorism after 9/11 were not all necessitated by
existing gaps in LOAC. Although the United States had complied with
the Geneva Conventions in previous conflicts even when its enemies had
not, the Bush administration “deliberately scuttled” that legal framework
in the War on Terror.40 Instead, relying on a series of secret memos
generated by lawyers working in the Department of Justice’s Office of
Legal Counsel (the “OLC”), the administration created “a category of
prisoners outside the law.”41 Overriding objections from Secretary of
State Colin Powell and his legal advisor, William H. Taft IV, the Bush
administration adopted the OLC’s position that the “Geneva
37
See Hafetz, supra note 13, at 845 (discussing the Bush administration’s interrogation
techniques as having “bordered on, and in some cases amounted to, torture”).
38
See id. at 856 (arguing that the United States’ adoption of a war paradigm as part of its
counter-terrorism strategy has resulted in an expansion of state power at the expense of
individual liberties).
39
JONATHAN HAFETZ, HABEAS CORPUS AFTER 9/11: CONFRONTING AMERICA’S NEW
GLOBAL DETENTION SYSTEM (2011).
40
Id. at 16.
41
Id. at 18.
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Conventions did not apply to al Qaeda or the Taliban.”42 The lawlessness
of the United States’ conduct in the War on Terror was, at least in part,
intentional. According to Professor Hafetz, the Bush administration’s
decision to establish a detention facility for terror suspects at the U.S.
Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, was motivated by its belief that
“Guantánamo would be beyond the jurisdiction of the federal courts and
thus immune from judicial review.”43 The administration also believed
that those detained at Guantánamo would be effectively beyond the
jurisdictional reach of the writ of habeas corpus.44
Before it settled on the confusing appellation of “unlawful enemy
combatant,” the Bush administration evidenced confusion regarding the
status of those brought to the detention facility at Guantánamo. On the
one hand, Bush administration officials compared Guantánamo
detainees with enemy soldiers detained during prior wars.45 Treating
the detainees as battlefield “combatants” permitted the indefinite
detention of those captured just as one can detain any enemy combatant
during a conventional armed conflict for the duration of that conflict.46
At the same time, the Bush administration referred to the detainees as
“terrorists” and as “the worst of the worst,” suggesting that they were
detained for criminal activities rather than as battlefield combatants.47 In
fact, many of the detainees were simply in the wrong place at the wrong
time,48 but the United States did not accord them a hearing to determine
their combatant status, as required by both the Geneva Conventions and
Army Regulation 1908.49 As a result, Guantánamo became a “legal black
Id. at 20.
Id. at 29.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 33.
46
Id. Prisoners of war captured during an international armed conflict may be detained
until the conflict is ended through surrender or peace treaty. See Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 118, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135 (“Prisoners of War shall be released and repatriated without delay after the
cessation of active hostilities.”); see also Hafetz, supra note 13, at 847 (citing Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004), in support of the generally recognized legitimacy of
detention of enemy fighters to prevent their return to the battlefield).
47
See HAFETZ, supra note 39, at 33–34 (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining the
confusing nomenclature used by Bush administration officials to describe the status of the
detainees at Guantánamo).
48
See id. at 36–37 (describing some of the “victims of incompetent battlefield vetting”).
49
See GC III, supra note 5, at art. 5 (“Should any doubt arise as to whether persons,
having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, [should
be treated as Prisoners of War], such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present
Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.”);
HAFETZ, supra note 39, at 35–36 (noting in the War on Terror, the United States abandoned
its practice, established during the Vietnam and Persian Gulf wars, of providing tribunals
consistent with Article 5 of GC III).
42
43
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hole” in which the detainees were tossed indefinitely based on elements
of the Geneva Conventions, but in which they were stripped of the
privileges guaranteed by those same Conventions.50
While the detention facility at Guantánamo, along with the Iraqi
prison, Abu Ghraib, garnered most of the media attention, they were just
part of a “U.S.-run global detention system.”51 Other U.S.-operated
detention facilities were at least as bad as Guantánamo. Conditions at
Bagram Theater Internment Facility at the Bagram Air Base (“Bagram”)
were so horrific that one prisoner who experienced internment at both
Bagram and Guantánamo described his experience at the former as “the
longest days of [his] life.”52 The ICRC reported gross mistreatment at
Bagram in violation of the Geneva Conventions, and at least two
detainees died at Bagram as a result of brutal interrogations during
which they sustained injuries equivalent to what would have occurred
had they been “run over by a bus.”53 Like the detainees at Guantánamo,
the Bagram detainees did not get the benefit of status review by a
“competent tribunal” as required by the Geneva Conventions. Instead,
the United States introduced Enemy Combatant Review Boards, whose
procedures “lacked the safeguards necessary to achieve accurate
results.”54
The detention systems set up in Iraq were not much different. U.S.operated detention centers in Iraq held civilians as well as combatants
without adequate review procedures that might insure that, consistent
with LOAC, the United States was justified in continuing to intern those
it had detained.55 In Professor Hafetz’s view, Iraq became another
Guantánamo, highlighting “the dangers of extrajudicial detention and
the importance of habeas corpus.”56
Professor Hafetz does his best to describe conditions at the prisons
about which we have some information, but he cannot describe what
occurred in the name of the War on Terror at various CIA “black sites” at
which even the identity of the prisoners is not revealed and to which the
ICRC has no access, itself a violation of LOAC.57 In order to effectuate

50
See id. at 34 (noting Guantánamo detainees were afforded neither the protections
owed to prisoners of war nor those afforded to criminal suspects).
51
Hafetz, supra note 13, at 846.
52
HAFETZ, supra note 39, at 49 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
53
Id.
54
Id. at 50.
55
See id. at 62–63 (describing the inadequacies of the status review procedures
established by the U.S.-led Multi-National Force–Iraq).
56
Id. at 67.
57
See id. at 58–60 (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing the network of secret
prisons into which hundreds of “ghost prisoners” disappeared).
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the delivery of terror suspects to black sites and to countries that would
conduct the sort of interrogations that U.S. law does not permit, the
United States developed a program of “extraordinary rendition.”58 This
See HAFETZ, supra note 39, at 51–60 (describing some detainees who were subject to
extraordinary rendition); Hafetz, supra note 13, at 851 (describing the transition in U.S. use
of rendition from “rendition to justice” to “extraordinary rendition”); see also First
Amended Compl. at 1, ¶2, Mohammed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., No. 5:07-cv-02798 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 1, 2007) (characterizing extraordinary rendition as involving the “clandestine and
forcible transportation of terrorism suspects to secret overseas detention facilities where
they are placed beyond the reach of the law and subjected to torture and other forms of
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment”); Leila Nadya Sadat, Extraordinary Rendition,
Torture, and Other Nightmares from the War on Terror, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1200, 1201 n.4
(2007) (relying on definitions of “extraordinary rendition” provided by the New York City
Bar Association and Wikipedia (internal quotation marks omitted)). Recent scholarship
exploring the government’s extraordinary rendition program includes the following: Alan
W. Clarke, Rendition to Torture: A Critical Legal History, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (2009)
(providing a history of the development of government-sponsored rendition, which was
used initially to bring fugitives to trial, and describing the significant expansion of the
United States’ extraordinary rendition program under the George W. Bush administration
until its abolition in January 2009); Lucien J. Dhooge, The State Secrets Privilege and Corporate
Complicity in Extraordinary Rendition, 37 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 469 (2009) (concluding the
state secrets privilege appropriately shields the policy of extraordinary rendition from
judicial examination); Louis Fisher, Extraordinary Rendition: The Price of Secrecy, 57 AM. U. L.
REV. 1405 (2008) (arguing from the Founding era until 9/11, it was generally understood
that rendition required congressional authorization and was for the purpose of bringing a
fugitive to trial); Victor Hansen, Extraordinary Renditions and the State Secrets Privilege:
Keeping Focus on the Task at Hand, 33 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 629 (2008) (suggesting
means of oversight of executive actions through the court’s role in providing individuals
the opportunity to vindicate their rights, while also protecting legitimate state secrets);
Jules Lobel, Extraordinary Rendition and the Constitution: The Case of Maher Arar, 28 REV.
LITIG. 479 (2008) (relating that since 9/11, the United States has “reportedly transferred
more than 100 suspected terrorists to countries that routinely torture prisoners” and
focusing on the extraordinary rendition of Maher Arar); Daniel L. Pines, Rendition
Operations: Does U.S. Law Impose Any Restrictions?, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 523 (2011)
(concluding U.S. law provides few legal restrictions and very few practical limitations on
the ability of the United States in rendition operations, whether to the United States or
elsewhere); Sadat, supra (examining the law governing rendition from U.S. territories or by
U.S. agents and arguing that the extraordinary rendition program from occupied Iraq
violates basic principles and precedents of international law); Margaret L. Satterthwaite,
Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and the Rule of Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1333 (2007) (contending that rendition is among the anti-terror techniques that the U.S.
government has defended through legal arguments that intentionally “skirt[ ] the rule of
law” by exploiting ambiguities and gaps in international human rights and humanitarian
law); D.A. Jeremy Telman, Intolerable Abuses: Rendition for Torture and the State Secrets
Privilege, 63 ALA. L. REV. 429 (2012); William G. Weaver & Robert M. Pallitto, The Law:
“Extraordinary Rendition” and Presidential Fiat, 36 PRES. STUD. Q. 102 (2006) (arguing that,
while U.S. Presidents have only recently claimed the power to authorize extraordinary
renditions and that U.S. history suggests that such renditions are illegal, they are tolerated
under principles of judicial deference to executive expertise); David Weissbrodt & Amy
Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition and the Humanitarian Law of War and Occupation, 47 VA. J.
INT’L L. 295 (2007) (contending that the United States’ extraordinary rendition program
58
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program involved the United States in further violations of both U.S. and
international law, which forbid the United States from delivering a
person to a state in which the United States believes it is likely that the
person will be subjected to torture.59
The U.S. Supreme Court stepped in, deciding three cases in 2004,60
which caused the Bush administration and Congress to devise new
detention schemes in their continued efforts to place their detention
policies beyond the review of any Article III court.
The Bush
administration created the new Combatant Status Review Tribunal
(“CSRT”) system, which purported to provide final determinations of
the legality of continued detentions, thus eliminating the need for resort
to the federal court system through habeas proceedings.61 As the cases
challenging that unconstitutional elimination of habeas rights wended
their way through the court system, Congress stepped in with the
Detainee Treatment Act (”DTA”), which sought, among other things, to
strip detainees of their habeas rights.62 Anticipating that the Supreme
Court would restore habeas rights to detainees in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,63
the Bush administration switched its model from wartime detention to
criminal prosecution and transferred some detainees, like the alleged

constitutes grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and proposing legal mechanisms to
address those breaches); David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition and
the Torture Convention, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 585 (2006) (contending that extraordinary rendition
violates both the UN Convention Against Torture and domestic law prohibitions on torture
and conspiracy to commit torture); Matteo M. Winkler, When “Extraordinary” Means Illegal:
International Law and European Reaction to the United States Rendition Program, 30 LOY. L.A.
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 33 (2008) (focusing on the European reaction to the abduction of Abu
Omar in Italy and concluding that the U.S. extraordinary rendition program violates
international legal norms prohibiting torture).
59
See HAFETZ, supra note 39, at 56 (characterizing rendition as a violation of two
international conventions to which the United States is a party: the Convention against
Torture and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)).
60
See generally Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (finding the government’s
treatment of Hamdi did not accord with the constitutional requirements of due process
because he was given no opportunity to rebut the government’s allegations before a neutral
adjudicatory body); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (permitting Guantánamo detainees
to file habeas petitions challenging their detentions); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 425 (2004)
(dismissing Padilla’s and al-Marri’s habeas petitions because they were filed against the
wrong person and in the wrong court, but paving the way for the re-filing of the same
petitions in the Fourth Circuit).
61
See HAFETZ, supra note 39, at 135 (describing litigation in which the government
claimed that the CSRT process “satisfied any rights [detainees] had” to due process).
62
See id. at 140 (describing efforts to amend the federal habeas statute to eliminate habeas
rights for Guantánamo detainees).
63
548 U.S. 557 (2006).
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“dirty bomber” Jose Padilla, to the federal court system.64 With Hamdan,
the Supreme Court came full circle, striking down a domestic regime for
dealing with detainees in wartime because it was inconsistent with
international legal standards codified in CA3 of the Geneva
Conventions.65
While Professor Hafetz highlights U.S. violations of LOAC in the
War on Terror, he also describes the ways in which various laws passed
in connection with the War on Terror violated our own domestic legal
traditions, especially those regarding the availability of the writ of habeas
corpus. He discusses in some detail the cases of Jose Padilla, Ali Saleh
Kahlah al-Marri, and Yaser Hamdi, all of whom were detained
incommunicado and denied access to lawyers.66 The fact that Padilla
and Hamdi were U.S. citizens did not entitle them to any procedural
rights, nor did it protect them against harsh treatment.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently upheld
Padilla’s conviction and called for an increase in his sentence of 208
months incarceration for conspiracy to harm people overseas and for
material support for terror organizations.67 In her partial dissent, Judge
Rosemary Barkett observed:
Padilla presented substantial, detailed, and compelling
evidence about the inhumane, cruel, and physically,
emotionally, and mentally painful conditions in which
he had already been detained for a period of almost four
years. For example, he presented evidence at sentencing
of being kept in extreme isolation at the military brig in
South Carolina where he was subjected to cruel
interrogations, prolonged physical and mental pain,
extreme environmental stresses, noise and temperature
variations, and deprivation of sensory stimuli and
sleep.68
Judge Barkett also noted that none of these allegations were challenged
on appeal.69

64
See HAFETZ, supra note 39, at 145 (noting Padilla was indicted on terrorism-related
charges in Miami two days before the government’s response was due to Padilla’s renewed
certiorari petition to the Supreme Court).
65
See id. at 148 (summarizing Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 630–34).
66
Id. at 73–78.
67
United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085, 1119 (11th Cir. 2011).
68
Id. at 1131 (Barkett, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
69
Id.
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The Bush administration remained committed to its policy of
extrajudicial detention. Shortly after the Hamdan decision was issued,
the Bush administration drafted and Congress passed the Military
Commissions Act (“MCA”),70 which sought to interpret the Geneva
Conventions so as to eliminate recourse to them as a possibility for those
subject to detention in the War on Terror.71 The MCA also sought once
again to strip detainees of their habeas rights.72 However, in Boumediene
v. Bush,73 the Supreme Court once again ruled, in a five to four decision,
that the CSRT process coupled with limited appellate review as provided
in the DTA were inadequate substitutes for habeas proceedings. The
Court invalidated the MCA’s elimination of habeas rights for
Guantánamo detainees and directed the government to conduct prompt
hearings on the legality of continued detention of people captured in
connection with the War on Terror and detained at Guantánamo.74
While the Supreme Court has also recognized the possibility that
detainees subject to U.S. control at foreign prisons may bring habeas suits,
Hafetz notes that lower courts have significantly narrowed the
availability of that remedy.75
Professor Hafetz also rebuts arguments critical of the efficacy of a
criminal law model for dealing with terrorists. Professor Hafetz first
addresses the objection that criminal law is limited in that it can only
punish past wrongdoing rather than prevent future harm.76 However,
prosecutors have actually been very successful in recent years in gaining
convictions of terror suspects based on statutes imposing criminal
Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
See HAFETZ, supra note 39, at 152–53 (noting the MCA gave the President authority to
interpret the Geneva Conventions and prohibited individuals from relying on the
Conventions in judicial proceedings).
72
Id. at 153.
73
553 U.S. 723 (2008).
74
HAFETZ, supra note 39, at 158. In Munaf v. Green, decided the same day as Boumediene,
the Court considered habeas petitions brought by prisoners detained in Iraq under the
authority of the Multi-National Force-Iraq. 553 U.S. 674 (2008). Although the Court found
that such prisoners could file habeas petition so long as they were subject to the authority of
the United States, it also found these particular petitioners were detained for the purposes
of criminal prosecution in a foreign country. No U.S. court could provide relief in such
cases. HAFETZ, supra note 39, at 167–68. Thus, while the Court seemed to be expanding (or
reinforcing) the jurisdictional scope of habeas review, it also suggested that the government
might easily evade such review by transferring custody to foreign governments. But this
practice raises problems regarding the non-refoulement obligation under international
human rights law. See id. at 194–95 (discussing human rights bodies’ construction of the
obligation of non-refoulment as barring governments from transferring people in their
custody, regardless of location, to other states in which the detainees will be in danger of
being subjected to torture).
75
Hafetz, supra note 13, at 848–49.
76
HAFETZ, supra note 39, at 220.
70
71
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penalties for providing “material support” to terrorist organizations and
under conspiracy laws.77
Professor Hafetz also addresses concerns regarding the difficulty in
protecting state secrets in the context of criminal prosecutions of
suspected terrorists.78 In so doing, Professor Hafetz relies on the
Classified Information Procedures Act (“CIPA”),79 which has
successfully protected state secrets in criminal proceedings for decades,
without significant diminution of the government’s ability to prosecute
Through discussion of numerous successful
criminal suspects.80
prosecutions of terror suspects,81 Professor Hafetz builds a convincing
case that our criminal justice system is up to the challenges presented by
asymmetrical warfare.82 The Bush administration’s strategy of seeking to
place its detention system outside the law, beyond the review of any
court, has proved to be unnecessary: We can prosecute terrorists for
their criminal conduct in a manner that is consistent with both our
constitutional protections afforded to criminal suspects and with LOAC.
Professor Frakt reaches the same conclusion with respect to DPH, noting
that “the prosecution of civilians who directly participated in hostilities
is, quite properly, handled by the domestic court system.”83 Professor
Hafetz’s contribution to this volume builds on his earlier work and
contends that the way in which the War on Terror has been
institutionalized has done lasting harm to protections of civil liberties in
the United States. What seemed like “a temporary accommodation to
the exigencies” of the War on Terror has resulted in “a permanent

77
Id. at 221–22; see Hafetz, supra note 13, at 855 (noting federal prosecutors have
obtained over 400 convictions in terrorism-related cases since 9/11).
78
HAFETZ, supra note 39, at 223.
79
Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025, 2025–21 (1980) (codified at 18 U.S.C. app. 3).
80
See LARRY M. EIG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 89-172 A, CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
PROCEDURES ACT (CIPA): AN OVERVIEW (1989), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
secrecy/89-172.pdf (“Congress enacted the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA)
to provide a . . . [means] for determining . . . whether a prosecution may proceed that both
protects information the Executive regards as sensitive to security and assures the
defendant a fair trial consistent with the mandates of the Constitution.” (footnote omitted));
Victor Hansen & Lawrence Friedman, The Case Against Secret Evidence, 12 ROGER WILLIAMS
U. L. REV. 772, 786 (2007) (stating that CIPA was designed to address graymail cases “in
which defendants threatened to disclose classified information at trial to force the
government to dismiss the case”).
81
See HAFETZ, supra note 39, at 226–27 (discussing prosecution of Zacarias Moussaoui);
id. at 228–29 (discussing prosecution of those responsible for bombing U.S. embassies in
East Africa in 1998); id. at 255 (discussing prosecution of the shoe bomber, Richard Reid).
82
See id. at 254 (noting all federal prosecutions and military commissions were
problematic).
83
Frakt, supra note 20, at 761.
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transformation in the relationship among the state, society, and the
individual.”84
Professor Hafetz notes that the three branches of the federal
government have contributed during the Obama administration to the
continuation of policies introduced during the Bush administration.
Although President Obama campaigned on a promise to close the
detention center at Guantánamo, in practice, it has proven quite difficult
to do so,85 in part because Congress has legislated aggressively to
prevent Guantánamo’s closure.86 The Obama administration has also
continued the Bush administration’s policy of indefinite detention of
terror suspects,87 and in some cases Congress has pushed to expand the
availability of indefinite detention to include new categories of
detainees.88 Courts have generally acquiesced in indefinite detention
schemes.89
The Obama administration has also been unable to phase out the use
of military commissions as it originally hoped to do. Congressional
opponents of the use of civilian criminal courts for the prosecution of
terror suspects have actually expressed concern that constitutional
protections available in such courts could impede prosecution.
Moreover, they advocate the continued use of harsh interrogation
techniques that they believe will enable the government to extract from
detainees useful information relevant to potential future attacks on the
United States, its citizens, or its installations.90 Finally, Professor Hafetz
points out that the Obama administration has continued the Bush
administration’s policy of using targeted killings as a tool in counterterrorism and has even expanded the program through the use of drone
aircraft.91
The dynamic of the U.S. War on Terror exhibits a striking parallel to
Otto von Bismarck’s strategy that resulted in a conservative unification
of Germany in the nineteenth century.92 Bismarck created a series of
Hafetz, supra note 13, at 857.
Id. at 852.
86
Id. at 853.
87
Id.
88
See id. (discussing the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act that would permit
indefinite detention of persons whose conduct was unrelated to the 9/11 attacks and who
were not affiliated with al Qaeda).
89
Id. at 854.
90
Id. at 855.
91
Id. at 856.
92
See HANS-ULRICH WEHLER, THE GERMAN EMPIRE 1871–1918, at 54–55 (1985) (observing
the Emperor continued to control the three pillars of absolutism after unification but also
controlled the new imperial administration, and thus the unification was not democratic
but “autocratic, semi-absolutist sham constitutionalism”).
84
85
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crises in the 1860s under the banner of the primacy of foreign policy
(Primat der Außenpolitik), which led to wars with Denmark, Austria, and
France.93 These international crises were then succeeded by engineered
campaigns against various real or imagined enemies within: the
Kulturkampf with Catholics,94 the prolonged struggle against Democratic
Socialism,95 as well as the introduction of discriminatory policies against
Germany’s minority populations, including Poles, Jews, French, Danes,
and Lithuanians.96 Along the way, Bismarck exploited fears of external
or internal threats to promote new security measures.97 Liberals, who
were the chief supporters of German unification,98 supported Bismarck,
even though the unified Germany that he created preserved the
autocracy, provincialism, and militarism that liberals had hoped to
overcome through their cosmopolitan nationalism.99 Bismarck pulled off
perhaps the greatest political trick of modern history. He was never
really concerned with foreign policy at all. Rather, it was domestic
policy that was really primary all along (Primat der Innenpolitik).100
George W. Bush was not a political strategist of Bismarck’s caliber.
Rather, the main characteristic that he as President shared with Bismarck
as Chancellor was a tendency to manipulate foreign affairs for the
purposes of a domestic agenda.101 Recall that Bush campaigned on a
platform of building up the United States’ defensive capabilities but
93
See id. at 26–27 (calling the three wars “devices to legitimise the prevailing political
system against the striving for social and political emancipation of the middle classes” and
noting that “the three wars were waged for internal political reasons”).
94
See ERICH EYCK, BISMARCK AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE 202–10 (1964) (describing the
campaign in which Bismarck enrolled the Liberal Party to oppose the German Catholic
Center Party).
95
See id. at 236–37 (describing how Bismarck exploited a failed attempt to assassinate the
Emperor to push for new laws against the Social Democrats, launching an anti-Socialist
campaign that continued until the end of Bismarck’s career).
96
See WEHLER, supra note 92, at 105–13 (describing various imperial policies that sought
to weaken and undermine minority cultures within the Empire).
97
See id. at 102 (noting the government’s response to challenges was to promote new
laws “culminating in special measures which made a mockery of the notion of the equality
of the citizen before the law”).
98
See EYCK, supra note 94, at 175 (calling the National Liberal Party the “party of German
unification”).
99
See id. at 139–41 (noting that the Indemnity Bill, which resolved the Constitutional
Crisis of the 1860s, forced a split in the German Liberal Party in which the defenders of
“[t]he principle of the Rechtsstaat, of the state governed by law” were defeated by the forces
more committed to unification).
100
See WEHLER, supra note 92, at 184–92 (describing German foreign policy during the
Kaiserrich as a product of the needs of domestic policy).
101
See EYCK, supra note 94, at 57 (explaining that Bismarck was elevated to the position of
Prussian Minister-President because he was willing to take on the Prussian Parliament, by
dissolving it if necessary).
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using the armed forces only for war, not for nation-building.102 But 9/11
became the justification for extended nation-building campaigns in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Meanwhile, the Bush administration quickly
seized on the opportunity provided by the 9/11 attacks to attempt a
permanent renegotiation of the balance between civil liberties and
national security.103 The most lasting legacy of the Bush administration,
as Professor Hafetz illustrates, may well be the permanent expansion of
the national surveillance state,104 and the exploitation of an attack that
posed no existential threat to the United States to create a lasting state of
emergency.105
B. The Failed Criminal Law Approach to DPH
Professor Frakt’s contribution to this Issue describes the attempt by
the United States to treat DPH as a war crime and to prosecute detainees
through military commissions.106 The basis for doing so has never been
clear, as Professor Frakt cites to numerous authorities for the rule that
DPH itself is not a violation of LOAC.107 The fact that DPH is not a
violation of LOAC would not itself prevent the United States from
treating it as a criminal offense for domestic purposes, as it sought to do
first through an Executive Order from November 2001 and then through
the 2006 Military Commissions Act (“MCA”).108 However, as Professor
102
See George W. Bush, President of the United States of America, The 2nd Presidential
Debate (Oct. 11, 2000), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/election/
2000debates/2ndebate2.html) (“I don’t think our troops ought to be used for what’s called
nation-building. I think our troops ought to be used to fight and win war.”).
103
See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001); see also Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. PA. L.
REV. 77, 141–45 (2010) (describing the very weak legal rationale for the National Security
Agency’s illegal warrantless wiretapping program).
104
See Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1,
3 (2008) (describing the “National Surveillance State” as “a new form of governance that
features the collection, collation, and analysis of information about populations both in the
United States and around the world”). But see Orin S. Kerr, The National Surveillance State:
A Response to Balkin, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2179, 2180 (2009) (arguing that the major change has
not been the government’s approach to surveillance but the advent of new technologies).
105
See GIORGIO AGAMBEN, THE STATE OF EXCEPTION 1122 (2005) (describing the frequency
that western democratic parliamentary governments have been replaced by constitutional
dictatorships based on the executive’s recognition of a real or imagined crisis).
106
Frakt, supra note 20, at 732.
107
Id. (citing Michael N. Schmitt, Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities by
Private Contractors or Civilian Employees, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 511, 520 (2005)); ICRC Guidance,
supra note 18, at 83.
108
See 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(15)–(16) (2006) (creating the crimes of “Murder In Violation Of
The Law of War” and “Destruction Of Property In Violation Of The Law Of War”); Order
on Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism,
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Frakt explains, in defining the crime, U.S. law always relied on a
presumed criminal prohibition on DPH, creating great confusion in the
ensuing case law.109
Professor Frakt describes the idea of imposing criminal penalties for
DPH as “novel and untested” when introduced by executive order in
2001.110 The test did not go well. The Supreme Court’s decision in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld invalidated the military commissions established by
executive order before any detainees could be tried for unprivileged
belligerency.111 Congress responded with the MCA, and most of
Professor Frakt’s contribution describes the government’s attempts to
use that piece of legislation to prosecute before military commissions a
grand total of three detainees for DPH. Professor Frakt details all seven
cases brought before military commissions. Two resulted in convictions
after trial, five resulted in guilty pleas,112 and one resulted in dismissal of
all charges.113 Professor Frakt is well-positioned to discuss this case law,
as he was the appointed defense counsel to Mohammed Jawad, one of
the Guantánamo detainees subject to prosecution.114
The MCA seemed to address the criminalization of DPH by
requiring that the offense be “in violation of the law of war.” However,
the Department of Defense (“DOD”) provided interpretive guidance
indicating that it viewed all killings or destruction of property that were
caused by DPH to be LOAC violations.115 Initially, military courts
rejected that interpretation. In the Jawad case, the military judge rejected
the prosecution’s theory that DPH “by itself, is a violation of the laws of
war.”116 Military judges in two other cases similarly rejected the
government’s attempts to transform DPH into a per se violation of
LOAC.117
After Congress revised the MCA in 2009, the DOD issued more
explicit interpretive guidelines specifying that military commissions had
66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001) (creating the new offense of “Murder by an
Unprivileged Belligerent”).
109
Frakt, supra note 20, at 732–34; see also Hafetz, supra note 13, at 850–51.
110
Frakt, supra note 20, at 737.
111
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). See generally 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (invalidating
the military commissions).
112
Frakt, supra note 20, at 741.
113
See id. 744–49 (discussing the case of Mohammad Jawad); David J. R. Frakt, Mohammed
Jawad and the Military Commissions of Guantánamo, 60 DUKE L.J. 1367 (2010).
114
Frakt, supra note 20, at 742, n.59.
115
Id. at 736.
116
Id. at 746 (quoting United States v. Jawad, 2008 U.S. CMCR LEXIS, at *1 (A.C.M.R.
Sept. 28, 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (Ruling on Defense Motion to Dismiss—
Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (D-007)).
117
Frakt, supra note 20, at 747.
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jurisdiction to try people accused of DPH and could convict them of
crimes including murder “even if such conduct does not violate the
international law of war.”118 The DOD interpretation is mind-boggling:
Why would a military commission have jurisdiction over a crime
allegedly committed by a civilian that is not war crime?
Faced with the DOD’s obstinate insistence on the authority of
military commissions to try crimes that are not war crimes, military
judges finally caved. In October 2010, a military commission accepted
the guilty plea of Omar Khadr, despite the fact that he was charged with
doing nothing more than taking part in a conventional battle and using a
conventional weapon (a hand grenade) to kill a U.S. fighter.119 The
military commission denied various motions to dismiss the murder
charge against Khadr based on the fact that Khadr had not committed a
war crime.120 Because the case was resolved through a plea bargain, the
military commission never issued a definitive ruling on the issue.121
However, in United States v. Hamdan, the Court of Military Commission
Review issued a unanimous en banc decision adopting the DOD’s view
that DPH itself could be prosecuted as a war crime.122
The notion that DPH could be a war crime remains largely untested.
To this day, the prosecution of Omar Khadr, who was fifteen at the time
that he committed the acts that led to his prosecution, stands as the only
example of a conviction based on DPH as a war crime.123 Professor Frakt
proposes a narrower definition of the crime, limiting its application to
“those who cross international borders—as alien insurgents—for the
Professor Frakt
specific purpose of engaging in hostilities.”124
immediately notes that both the Australian David Hicks and the
Canadian Omar Khadr could be prosecuted under such a rule, although

118
Id. at 747 (emphasis omitted) (citing U.S. MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMM’NS, pt. IV,
§ 5(15)(c), at IV-13 (2010)).
119
Id. at 748 (citing Defendant’s Motion for Leave to Dismiss Complaint Without
Prejudice and Supporting Brief at *1, United States v. Khadr, Crim. No. 07-30014, 2007 U.S.
Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS, at 93015 (2007)).
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id. at 755–57. As Professor Frakt reports, the same court later expressed its reluctance
to “make conduct punishable by military commission without any reference to international
norms.” Id. 757 (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. al Bahlul, MCR 09-001 (U.S.
Ct. Military Comm’n Review Sept. 9, 2011) (en banc)).
123
Id. at 762.
124
Id. at 763.
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Khadr might be spared based on the fact that his father brought him to
Afghanistan.125
Professor Frakt’s recommendation would benefit some civilians
engaged in DPH who could sincerely claim that they were merely
protecting their homes and homelands from an invading force. His
proposal would render U.S. law more humane, but it would not bring
U.S. law, which criminalizes DPH, into line with LOAC, which does not.
Taken together, Professor Frakt’s and Professor Hafetz’s contributions
suggest that we need to move beyond domestic law solutions to the
constellation of problems that arise out of asymmetrical conflicts. The
three contributions discussed in the final Part of this Introduction do just
that.
II. REGULATING THE NEW WARFARE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
REGIMES
Three of our contributors propose radically divergent solutions for
the problems arising out of the new warfare. Lieutenant Colonel
VanLandingham envisions an evolving rule of custom within LOAC that
would permit multilateral humanitarian intervention, making use of
regional organizations recognized under Chapter 8 of the U.N.
Charter.126 Major Pedden proposes to address the challenges of the new
warfare through a new “minilateralism” and through a clear delineation
between international humanitarian law and international human rights
law, with the former being granted priority under the principle of lex
specialis derogat legi generali.127 Professor Blank proposes to address DPH
problems along with other complexities associated with the new warfare
through enforcement at the national, regional, and international levels
that will provide appropriate sanctions for violations of the principle of
distinction. The contributions to this Issue of Professor Blank and Major
Pedden are unusual in the realm of international humanities law (“IHL”)
scholarship because of their focus on the operationalization of LOAC.128
125
Id. It also may be relevant that since Khadr’s family moved to Afghanistan in 1995,
long before the United States invaded, it is hard to see how he could have traveled to
Afghanistan with the intention of engaging in hostilities. Id.
126
U.N. Charter arts. 52–54.
127
Major Iain D. Pedden, Lex Lacunae: The Merging Laws of War and Human Rights in
Counterinsurgency, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 803, 806 n.14 (2012). For a discussion of the term, see
Moisès Naìm, Minilateralism: The Magic Number to Get Real International Action, FOREIGN
POL’Y
(July/Aug.
2009),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/18/
minilateralism.
128
See also Blank & Guiora, supra note 4, at 57–58 (describing operationalization as
adapting LOAC to the realities of new warfare so that commanders are equipped with
proper training regimes and operational guidelines).
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That is, they focus not only on LOAC as defined in international
agreements, but also on state conduct as evidenced in military strategies,
military handbooks, and rules of engagement.
A. Expanding the Right of Humanitarian Intervention within the U.N.
System
Since the end of World War II, there have been occasional stirrings of
hope that collective security might actually bring an end to conventional
state-on-state warfare. Such was the design of the U.N. Charter’s
Chapter VII,129 of course, but the Cold War intervened to prevent the
promise of the Charter from being realized.130 As Lieutenant Colonel
VanLandingham details, individual states stepped into the breach, but
their actions that may have had humanitarian aims were tainted by selfinterest, and world opinion neither effectively condoned nor prevented
such interventions.131 There was a brief renaissance of hope for collective
security in the 1990s as the United States was able, with the approval of
the U.N. Security Council, to assemble an international coalition to
oppose the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait.132 Between 1990 and 1995, the
Security Council authorized the use of force in Iraq, Somalia, Yugoslavia,
Rwanda, and Haiti.133 But the brief window of opportunity quickly
slammed shut, as the international community was unable to intervene
to prevent genocides in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, and NATO somewhat
notoriously bombed Serbia without Security Council authorization in
order to prevent Serb atrocities in Kosovo.134
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the Security Council was willing
to authorize collective action to combat terrorism,135 but it would not go
so far as to authorize a renewal of hostilities against the government of
U.N. Charter arts. 39–51.
See Rachel E. VanLandingham, The Stars Aligned: The Legality, Legitimacy, and Legacy of
2011’s Humanitarian Intervention in Libya, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 859, 873 (2012) (noting the
voting rules in the Security Council stymied Security Council action and “frequently
neutered the entire UN collective security regime during” the Cold War).
131
Id. at 877–80.
132
See S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990) (calling on member states,
acting in coordination with the Government of Kuwait, to use all necessary means to
implement previous Resolutions relating to Iraq’s invasion and annexation of Kuwait).
133
VanLandingham, supra note 130, at 800.
134
See id. at 868 (contending the Security Council’s authorization of humanitarian
intervention in Libya weakens any claim that intervention without such authorization
could be lawful).
135
See S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) (calling on member states to
use all necessary means to combat terrorism); S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept.
12, 2001) (expressing readiness to take all necessary measures to respond to the terror
attacks of September 11, 2001).
129
130
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Saddam Hussein in Iraq.136 Because the Security Council was once again
paralyzed by disunity among its five permanent members, individual
states and coalitions assumed the dominant role in collective security.
Drawing on the recent U.N Security Council authorization of NATO
intervention in Libya,137 Lieutenant Colonel VanLandingham finds
grounds for optimism regarding the future prospects for effective
collective security measures in response to significant humanitarian
crises. Her contribution interacts with the other contributions to this
Issue in interesting ways. It suggests that, in the future, asymmetrical
warfare will be more of an issue for international law than for domestic
law, as the conflicts will be between multinational forces and armed
militias or the militaries of failed states.
Lieutenant Colonel
VanLandingham also suggests that the advent of Predator drone
technology may embolden military powers to engage in humanitarian
intervention more often, as they can do so without risk to their own
personnel.138 On the other hand, one might predict that if, as Lieutenant
Colonel VanLandingham suggests, U.N.-authorized humanitarian
intervention becomes the norm, there might be fewer asymmetrical
conflicts in the future because the U.N. might come to play its intended
role as a deterrent force to states or non-state actors that might otherwise
be inclined to resort to force.
As Lieutenant Colonel VanLandingham describes the Libya
intervention, it was made possible by a variety of developing doctrines,
none of which quite fit the situation, but which have come together in a
constellation of doctrines that she believes has the potential to harden
into a rule of customary international law. Such a rule would permit
Security Council authorized humanitarian intervention. The Security
Council has for some time recognized that human rights abuses can
“constitute a threat to international peace and security,” even if they
In addition, Lieutenant Colonel
occur in only one state.139
VanLandingham contends that the Security Council Resolution
authorizing intervention in Libya implements and reinforces the
“responsibility to protect doctrine” that the international community

See Richard A. Falk, What Future for the UN Charter System of War Prevention?, 97 AM. J.
INT’L L. 590, 592–93 (2003) (describing the U.N. Security Council’s refusal to go along with
U.S. and U.K. demands for authorization of an invasion of Iraq).
137
See VanLandingham, supra note 130, at 859 (citing S.C. Res. 1973, ¶¶ 4, 6–8, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011)), which authorized the use of force in Libya in response to the
humanitarian crisis brought about by the popular uprising that sought to remove
Muammar Gaddafi from power).
138
Id. at 865–66.
139
Id. at 860.
136
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endorsed in 2005.140 Finally, Lieutenant Colonel VanLandingham’s
analysis of the rhetoric underlying statements in support of intervention
in Libya suggests a growing sense among states of a moral norm
justifying humanitarian intervention to prevent mass atrocities.141
Lieutenant Colonel VanLandingham suggests that as humanitarian
intervention becomes more common, the difficult targeting decisions
that are the subject matter of the other contributions to this Issue will
also increase in frequency. She contends that the advent of drone
warfare will further complicate matters if states will contend, as the
United States did with respect to the Libyan conflict, that their
involvement in such conflicts do not constitute “hostilities.”142 However,
two points seem essential in this context.
First, the Obama
administration’s claim that U.S. involvement in the NATO intervention
in Libya did not constitute “hostilities” for the purposes of the War
Powers Resolution surprised many,143 who, like the Author of this
Introduction and Lieutenant Colonel VanLandingham, expected from
the Obama administration (and from the Legal Advisor to the

Id. at 861.
Id. at 864.
142
Id. at 866 (citing Robert M. Chesney, A Primer on the Libya/War Powers Resolution
Compliance Debate, BROOKINGS (June 17, 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/
2011/0617_war_powers_chesney.aspx?p=1); see also Harold Koh, Legal Advisor U.S. Dep’t
of State, Testimony on Libya and War Powers Before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee (June 28, 2011), available at http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Koh_Testimony.pdf. The War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973)
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–48 (2000)), calls for congressional authorization
of all uses of the U.S. armed forces within sixty days of their introduction into “hostilities”
absent a declaration of war, an extension, or a wartime emergency that prevents Congress
from meeting. War Powers Resolution, § 5(b), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541, 1544(b). The Obama
administration decided to avoid a confrontation with Congress over the legality of
continued U.S. participation in NATO actions in Libya by contending that, limited as they
were to air strikes and air support, U.S. participation in that NATO action did not
constitute “hostilities.” Charlie Savage & Mark Landler, White House Defends Continuing
U.S. Role in Libya Operation, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/06/16/us/politics/16powers.html?page wanted=all.
143
According to the New York Times, the U.S. military aircraft attacked Libyan air
defenses about sixty times, and U.S.-operated drones fired missiles at Qaddafi’s forces
about thirty times. Charlie Savage & Thom Shanker, Scores of U.S. Strikes in Libya Followed
Handoff to NATO, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2011, at A8. In contending the U.S. involvement in
Libya did not constitute “hostilities,” the Obama administration did not even have the
support of the Pentagon or the OLC, both of which reached the opposite conclusion.
Charlie Savage, 2 Top Lawyers Lost to Obama in Libya War Policy Debate, N.Y. TIMES, June 17,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/18/world/africa/18powers.html?hp; see also
Louis Fisher, Testimony of Louis Fisher before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
(June 28, 2011), available at http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Fisher_Testimony.
pdf (denouncing “[p]residential [d]oubletalk” with respect to the concept of “hostilities”).
140
141
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Department of State, Harold Koh)144 greater transparency and
compliance with the rule of law, especially with respect to war powers.145
Second, as the administration’s definition of “hostilities” is directly
relevant only for the purposes of the War Powers Resolution and
domestic law, it bears only a relationship of analogy to standards under
LOAC for establishing when the resort to force rises to the level of an
armed conflict.
But Lieutenant Colonel VanLandingham’s focus on this constellation
of doctrines that promote multinational intervention, whether based on a
“right” of humanitarian intervention or a “responsibility to protect”
suggests an erosion of traditional notions of state sovereignty.146 Her
work thus tracks themes in the development of international legal norms
that may run counter to Major Pedden’s focus on the need for the United
States to work towards minilateral solutions to international challenges.
B. Protecting Combatants through Treaty Law and the Lex Specialis
Principle
The point of departure for Major Pedden’s work is the relationship
between IHL and international human rights law. On that issue, the
United States has adopted the minority view that, in areas in which the
two bodies of law overlap, IHL should be recognized as the lex specialis,
which trumps the more general human rights law.147 The U.S. view has
some support from the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), which has
twice recognized the lex specialis status of LOAC.148 However, as Major

144
For condemnations of Koh’s inconsistency on the issue in the years before and after he
joined the Obama administration, see, for example, Paul Starobin, A Moral Flip-Flop?
Defining a War, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/07/opinion/
sunday/harold-kohs-flip-flop-on-the-libya-question.html?_r=2&ref=opinion; Mary Ellen
O’Connell, U.S. Strains Credibility on Its Libya Role, CNN (June 21, 2011),
http://www.cnn.com/2011/OPINION/06/21/oconnell.libya.military/index.html.
145
See Bruce Ackerman, Legal Acrobatics, Illegal War, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2011, at A27
(criticizing the Obama administration for ignoring the advice of the OLC); see also Trevor
W. Morrison, Libya, “Hostilities,” the Office of Legal Counsel, and the Process of Executive Branch
Legal Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 62, 74 (2011) (calling upon the Obama
administration to reaffirm its commitment to the tradition of executive branch deference to
the OLC’s conclusions).
146
VanLandingham, supra note 130, at 864–65.
147
Pedden, supra note 127, at 810–11.
148
See id. 816–19 (discussing the ICJ’s advisory opinions of the Use or Threat of Nuclear
Weapons and on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory).
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Pedden notes, the ICJ has done little to clarify how to handle cases that
implicate both bodies of law.149
The more prominent view is that the two bodies of law are
complementary—that is, wherever possible, courts should construe the
bodies of law as consistent with one another.150 As a result, human
rights principles have gained increasing prominence in international
adjudications involving LOAC. Major Pedden concedes that human
rights frameworks have also informed the U.S. Supreme Court’s wartime
jurisprudence in cases relating to the U.S. government’s detention
policies in the War on Terror.151
Major Pedden does not question the importance of human rights
considerations at the level of rules of engagement.152 In reviewing the
tactical directives issued by U.S. generals directing the counterinsurgency program in Afghanistan, as well as major works of
counterinsurgency theory, Major Pedden acknowledges that they adopt
an approach consistent with complementarity.153 As a result, the Tactical
Directives issued by the International Security Assistance Force (“ISAF”)
in Afghanistan, unclassified versions of which are attached as
appendices to Major Pedden’s contribution,154 expose ISAF forces to
increased risk.155 However, he maintains, rules of engagement adopted
as a matter of policy cannot and should not ripen into rules of binding
customary international law. “[T]he fact that we fight this way now
should not require us to fight this way forever.”156 Given that “the
influence of human rights law in armed conflict shifts more risk onto
combat personnel . . . [resulting in] more casualties,”157 the need for state
consent to emerging rules of custom is nowhere more important than in
the realm of LOAC.
Major Pedden raises reasonable concerns that documents like the
ICRC Guidance and the ICRC’s Customary International Humanitarian Law

149
See id. 816–17 (observing the ambiguity of the ICJ’s invocation of lex specialis in the
Nuclear Weapons case and that its later decision in the Wall case “did little to clarify the issue
in a meaningful way”).
150
Id. at 810–11.
151
Id. at 818.
152
See id. 812 (citing the U.S. Standing Rules of Engagement as an example of the
“effective importation of a widely-known legal standard from the human rights law
framework into the law of war”).
153
Id. at 821–24.
154
Id. at apps. B–D.
155
Id. at 805.
156
Id. at 825 (emphasis in original).
157
Id. at 819.
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Study,158 which import human rights standards into LOAC, can
contribute to an environment in which state practice alone is treated as
sufficient evidence of customary rules of law, without any evidence that
such practice is accompanied by opinio juris;159 that is, that state practice
is informed by the belief that the practice is required by international
law.160 In particular, Major Pedden echoes W. Hays Parks’ concerns that
the ICRC Guidance’s Recommendation IX imports into its DPH analysis
a proportionality test borrowed from human rights law.161
Major Pedden offers two proposals that would permit the United
States to reconcile conflicts between LOAC and human rights law. First,
he calls for “[t]he use of inherent executive authority to harmonize the
expression of the opinio juris in documents related to armed conflict.”162
Second, because of the challenges to finding international unanimity on
all matters relating to LOAC, Major Pedden suggests that the United
States adopt “minilateral” solutions to national security problems by
forging with like-minded states international agreements that would
have greater legitimacy in the eyes of the international community than
do unilateral declarations of states’ understandings of the requirements
of LOAC.163
Major Pedden extols the virtues of a minimalism that would allow
states to quickly negotiate an agreement that would not be diluted by the
need to satisfy too many participants.164 He contends that minilateral
treaties agreed upon by a “critical mass” of specially affected states
would achieve greater legitimacy in the world community than can
unilateral actions or statements of the law.165 One area in which Major
Pedden suggests that minilateral approach might be effective is the law
of targeted killing.166
At the same time, Major Pedden suggests that U.S. conduct must be
accompanied by and consistent with statements coming from the
Executive that express U.S. constructions of the opinio juris associated

JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW (2005).
159
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2)
cmt c. (1987) (“For a practice of states to become a rule of customary international law it
must appear that the states follow the practice from a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris
sive necessitatis) . . . .” (emphasis added)).
160
Pedden, supra note 127, at 813–14.
161
Id. at 815.
162
Id. at 805.
163
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
164
Id. 826–27.
165
Id. at 828.
166
Id.
158
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with particular aspects of customary international law.167 But Major
Pedden is not encouraged by the Obama administration’s embrace of the
“fundamental guarantees” enumerated in AP I’s Article 75,168 because
President Obama’s statement has increased confusion over whether or
not the United States is bound by Article 75 as a matter of customary
international law and over whether LOAC or humanitarian law
governs.169 But Article 75 is emblematic of the difficulty in trying to keep
these two bodies of law separate. Although it incorporates language
from human rights treaties,170 it is part of AP I and thus unquestionably a
part of LOAC as well.
C. Preserving Distinction in New Warfare
In different ways, the work of Professors Hafetz and Frakt suggests
that we should avoid attaching excessive criminal consequences to DPH.
Professor Blank, while not calling for the criminalization of DPH and
certainly not endorsing the improvisational chaos and human rights
abuses associated with the War on Terror’s treatment of terror suspects,
seeks to bring the focus back to key principles. In particular, she argues
that effective implementation of and adherence to LOAC depends on
robust enforcement of all violations of the principle of distinction—that
is, distinction in conduct, and not only in targeting―through the
mechanisms of military justice and through national, regional, and
international sanctions, and accountability regimes. Her work, like that
of Major Pedden, focuses on the operationalization of LOAC principles
at the level of the Rules of Engagement (“ROE”) that inform combat
decisions, and she addresses not only DPH but the broader problem of
violations of the principle of distinction in the new warfare.
As Professor Blank notes, distinction has two components. First, it
permits the targeting of combatants and prohibits the targeting of noncombatants, unless they engage in DPH. Second, it requires that
combatants identify themselves as such.171 Professor Blank points out
that international criminal tribunals have repeatedly imposed criminal
sanctions for the intentional targeting of civilians,172 and the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court (“Rome Statute”) also
imposes sanctions for targeting decisions that violate the principle of
Id. at 829.
Id. at 830–31.
169
Id. at 831.
170
See id. at 830 n.163 (noting the language of Article 75 was “distilled from the ICCPR”).
171
Blank, supra note 15, at 766.
172
See id. at 782 (discussing cases decided by the International Criminal Tribunal for
Yugoslavia).
167
168
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proportionality by causing excessive harm to civilians.173 In addition,
national courts enforce national criminal codes and military manuals
that impose criminal sanctions for indiscriminate or intentional attacks
on civilians.174
Despite this progress in enforcing one aspect of the principle of
distinction, there is at present little, if any, enforcement of violations and
accountability for the equally serious problem of combatants who
undermine the principle of distinction by disguising themselves as
civilians.175 “Fighters who launch attacks in civilian clothing, from
protected civilian sites and use civilians as shields are violating LOAC
and must be held accountable for their conduct.”176 Unless those who do
so are held accountable, “distinction will only be enforced halfway.”177
Blank notes numerous cases in which LOAC rules prohibiting perfidious
attacks have been ignored in cases to which they obviously applied.178
Perfidy undermines the principle of distinction, thus leaving
combatants to perceive civilians as potential combatants and justifiable
targets. Professor Blank correctly notes that the victims of perfidy are
the innocent civilians who “become the unintentional and tragic targets
of soldiers who mistake them for legitimate targets when unable to
distinguish between fighters and civilians.”179 More generally, the
victims are innocent civilians who are targeted because combatants have
come to doubt their ability to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants, or the victims may be wounded combatants placed hors de
combat who are shot because soldiers have come to fear treachery by
wounded combatants who play possum.180
Yet prosecutions of perfidy are not always the appropriate response.
Professor Blank discusses the perfidy of suicide bombers and of Bosnian
Serbs who disguised themselves as U.N. peacekeepers and then
massacred Bosnian Muslims who voluntarily surrendered. The threat of
criminal prosecution will not deter a suicide bomber, and the Bosnian
Serbs at Srebrenica were not prosecuted for perfidy because they were
173
See id. at 781 (discussing Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8, July
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90).
174
Id. at 782–83.
175
Id. at 766.
176
Id. at 778.
177
Id.
178
See id. 786–88 (citing the U.N. report on Sri Lanka and the Bosnian Serb massacre at
Srebrenica, in which thousands of Bosnian Muslims were tricked into surrendering to—
and were later massacred by—Serbs disguised as UN peacekeepers).
179
Id. at 790.
180
See SOLIS, supra note 3, at 327–30 (describing the U.S. soldiers’ practice in the Iraq War,
known as “double-tap[ping],” which involved “shooting of wounded or apparently dead
insurgents to insure that they are dead”).
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prosecuted for genocide and crimes against humanity,181 which Professor
Blank acknowledges is a justifiable reason to forego a prosecution for
perfidy.182
The placement of military objectives in residential areas or in
protected places such as hospitals or places of worship is also a LOAC
violation that undermines the principles of distinction.183 Professor
Blank emphasizes the obligation of all parties to take precautionary
measures to protect civilian populations.184 While legal commentary and
the news media have focused on violations of the obligation to take
precautions by states that have attacked military installations in civilian
areas,185 less attention has focused on the violations embodied in the
placement of such military installations in civilian areas in the first
place.186 Similarly, Professor Blank notes that the widespread practice of
using civilians as human shields—a clear violation of AP I, Article 51
and customary international law187—is rarely prosecuted in national
courts or international tribunals.188
Professor Blank does not see prosecutions as a panacea. Rather,
training manuals and military leaders must treat protecting the principle
of distinction as a high priority, and to a large extent they already do so.
Professor Blank’s focus on the operationalization of LOAC illustrates a
degree of flexibility in the lawful ROE applicable to different types of
armed conflict. For example, Professor Blank notes that the ROE for the
conflict in Iraq focused on status-based targeting, designating certain
paramilitary “groups and organizations” as “hostile and engaged,” and
therefore appropriate for targeting.189 In Afghanistan, by way of
contrast, it was much more difficult to identify hostile groups and
organizations. The ROE applicable in Afghanistan thus called for
conduct-based targeting based on hostile acts or manifest hostile

Blank, supra note 15, at 788.
Id.
183
See id. at 777, 794 (discussing recent conflicts in which the co-mingling of military and
civilian objects have undermined the principle of distinction).
184
See id. 791–92 (discussing obligations of states parties under AP I, art. 57).
185
See id. at 792–95 (detailing numerous instances and noting the “absence of―or at best
minimal―condemnation of the practice of placing military equipment and objectives in
civilian areas”).
186
Id. at 795.
187
See id. at 798 (quoting AP I, art. 51(7) and referencing the Rome Statute, as well as
military manuals).
188
See id. at 797–800 (enumerating recent uses of human shields, noting the rarity of
prosecutions and concluding that “[g]iven the widespread use of human shields,
significantly greater efforts are needed to prosecute perpetrators of this serious war
crime”).
189
Id. at 778–79.
181
182
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intent.190 The fact that ROE can be adapted in response to the
idiosyncrasies of a particular conflict means that ROE can be calibrated
to assure LOAC is operationalized in ways that “maximize protection of
innocent civilians while still enabling mission fulfillment.”191
Where fighters fail to engage in combat in accordance with the
principle of distinction, the failure to hold them accountable simply
ratifies their unlawful behavior and encourages future violations that
only serve to endanger innocent civilians.
The mechanisms for
enforcement are already in place, as “[n]ational courts, national criminal
codes, and military manuals also criminalize attacks on civilians.”192
International fact-finding investigations are also an important
mechanism for establishing both the factual basis and the legal issues
that arise out of particular armed conflicts.193 While states must be
willing to prosecute their own personnel for perfidious conduct,
international tribunals should prosecute with equal vigor all serious
violations of the principle of distinction. National and international factfinding investigations should provide a basis for a more robust system of
accountability that would create more comprehensive enforcement of
both aspects of the principle of distinction.
IV. CONCLUSION
If we combine Professor Blank’s advocacy of transnational solutions
to violations of the principle of distinction with Major Pedden’s
advocacy of minilateralism, we may arrive at a solution that can address
the concerns of all of our contributors.
Major Pedden sees
internationalism primarily as a source of new international obligations
that will increase the risks faced by U.S. armed forces in facing
counterinsurgency. But a minilateral approach to the question of
criminal sanctions for DPH is a real possibility and would have a great
deal more international legitimacy than do the ad hoc domestic regimes
described by Professors Hafetz and Frakt. Minilateral solutions are also
appropriate in the context of humanitarian interventions under the
auspices of regional organizations for which Lieutenant Colonel
VanLandingham advocates.
Thus the contributions to this Issue, each useful on its own, are
especially valuable when read together. They offer a wealth of
information on the subject of asymmetrical conflict, as well as proposals

190
191
192
193

Id. at 779.
Id. at 781.
Id. at 782.
Id. at 802.
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for means by which greater clarity can be achieved in the realm of the
fundamental LOAC principle of distinction.
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